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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE ()F UTAH
IN RE:
GEORGE E. BRIDWELL,
Disciplinary Proceeding

~Case No.

~

11546

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
All italics are ours.
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a disciplinary proceeding before the Board
of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar.
DISPOSITION BY
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
The Board of Commissioners of the Utah State
Bar adopted the Findings and Conclusions of the Hearing Committee and recommended disbarment.
1
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant, George E. Bridwell, seeks dismissal
and vindication.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The charges involved in this disciplinary proceeding arise from representation by George Bridwell of
Precisa Calculating Machine Co., Inc., a Utah corporation and the complaining witness Eugene 'Vagner and
his ex-wife Nellie 'Vaguer from the Fall of 1957 to the
Fall of 1961. ·Bridwell's representation of the above
arose from an investigation by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue which led to large tax assessments. The initial
nssessments at the time when Bridwell was hired
nmounted to the sum of $90,000.00 for Precisa Calculating :Machine Co. and $94,015.12 for Eugene and Nellie
'Vagner for 1954, 1955 and 1956. Ultimately, pmsuant
to investigation, the following assessments were made:
Eugene and Nellie 'Vagner,
J ;)5.~, taxes ____ $112,878.99
T\:nnHr ________ 73,732.66
Tr' a)

____________ $186,611.65

: -~~i L't-\:es ____ $169,050.89
l ·. JJ': L ~-

'«·[:'.]

________

84,525.45

------------$253,576.34
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1956 taxes ----$ 85,549.09
Penalty ________ 42, 77 4.55

Total ____________ $128,323.64
1957 taxes ----$ 34,004.54
Penalty ________ 17,917.51

Total ------------$ 50,922.05
The total assessments for the above four years on the
W agners amounted to $401,483.51 taxes plus penalty
of $218,950.17 for a total of $620,533.68. The assessments made after investigation on Precisa Calculating
Machine Co. were as follows:
1954 --------------$ 45,228.57
32,112.58
19.55
34,688.28
1956
11,750.69
1957

Total ------------$123, 780.12
At the conclusion of Bridwell's representation of the
\Vagners and Precisa Calculating Machine Co. in 1961,
the Wagner assessments were settled for $18,572.31
and the assessments of Precisa Calculating Machine Co.
were settled for $11,750.69. Thus, total assessments
amounting to $7 44,213.80 were finally settled as a result
of the services of George E. Bridwell for a total of
$30,323.00 (Ex. 35).

After Wagner was questioned by representatives
of thf: Internal Revenue Service, he sought the services

3
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of Bridwell and immediately went back to Switzerland
taking with him approximately $28,000.00 of the funds
of Precisa Calculating Machine Co. (R. 32, 33, 34,
241). Bridwell had represented Wagner in a divorce
action which had been concluded prior to the time of
this representation. Bridwell was out of the office at
the time that Wagner sought his services, and Wagner
left word with David Bybee then sharing space with
Bridwell. Bridwell, on his return, commenced representing Precisa Calculating Machine Co. and the
Wagners.
In a letter dated October 30, 1957, Bridwell set
forth the terms of the representation as far as fee was
concerned (Ex. 1) . In this letter, Bridwell notified
Wagner of the preliminary assessments against both him
and the company, and that a tax lien had been placed
against all company assets as well as the assets of the
'Vagners. As far as the fee arrangement was concerned,
Bridwell stated in part as follows:
"If you desire me to represent you in all these
matters, I must have carte-blanche authority and
ample expenses so that I may hire accountants
of my own choosing to work with me.

My fee for handling the matter all the way
through the administrative process of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue will be $14,000.00. Those
processes include working with the Agents during their preparations of final reports, then to a
conference hearing. And if we are not then
satisfied we will go to the Appellate staff, and
finally to the Tax Court."
4
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Bridwell also warned in this le'tter of the possibility of
criminal prosecution. Bridwell further stated concerning the payment of the fee:
"I request, if you desire my services, to send
$8,000.00 now, as a fee and expense advance.

The balance of my fee to be paid at the rate of
$2,000.00 per month, expenses to be paid when

itemized."
Precisa Calculating Machine Co., during the time
in question, was a corporation owned primarily by one
Mr ..Jost and a parent corporation in Switzerland known
as Precisa A.G., with Wagner owning less than onefifth of the stock (R. 219).
Bridwell obtained the services of Frank Nielson,
a local C.P.A., to assist. Nielson is a man who was
formerly an employee of the Internal Revenue Service
and as such had a great deal of experience in tax fraud
cases. As the case progressed, not only were additional
years added, but the assessments went way up and in
Bridwell's words (R. 330):

"* * * this claim turned into a real can of
worms with indicia of fraud rampant throughout
the whole thing. Of course, I use that for want
of a better word. The classic example of fraud
involving Swiss banks by American citizens.
Of course, Mr. Wagner is a nationalized citizen
of the United States and, oh, one of the things,
for instance, that we had to contend with - by
'we ' I mean Mr. Nielson and with the special
age~ts - were withdrawals from Utah depo~its
in the Swiss bank accounts and money commg
back to a New York bank where it's received
5
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by cashier's checks, checks are cashed, purchases
of automobiles, property, that sort of thing."
In the Fall of 1958, during the course of the representation, it was decided that Bridwell and Nielson
would go to Switzerland to personally go through all
of the bank account records and to prepare an affidavit
to be signed by the principal stockholders outlining the
history of the Precisa Calculating Machine Co. and
Wagner's part in this Company.
Wagner himself had suggested the trip in a letter
to Bridwell, dated June 13, 1958 (Ex. I). Bridwell
and Nielson took the trip to Switzerland in October
1958. They were there for approximately three weeks.
During the time they were there, Bridwell orally discussed the fee arrangements with Wagner and the fact
that the cases had turned out much larger than originally
anticipated, and Wagner agreed that the fee would be
adjusted (R. 331, 332). It had been agreed right from
the start that Bridwell could pay himself from the corporate bank account periodically (R. 332).
The first two checks on Bridwell's fee were also
signed by Mr. Grothe, who was the local ranking officer
after Wagner's departure, but later on Grothe was removed from the company and Bridwell was the only
one who could sign checks on the company bank account.
However, the company office remained open for a
period of time and the cancelled checks and bank statements would be sent to the company address at 375 West
4th South, Salt Lake City, Utah. Mrs. N ewbol<l
6
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handled the company correspondence and business and
later, Mrs. Wagner, the ex-wife, continued handling
the business until the building was sealed off on a seizure
by the Internal Revenue Service, after which time,
there were no more banking transactions ( R. 333) .
Exhibit F is an exhibit which shows the dates and
amounts of the fees drawn by George Bridwell, showing
draws through the year 1958 and a final payment in
1961 from money refunded by the Internal Revenue
Service after the settlement of the tax cases. This exhibit shows a total amount of money collected for fee
in the sum of $28,653.36 plus $2,000.00 in 1961 received
from Wagner.
Nielson was present during the trip to Switzerland
in 1958 at times when Bridwell and Wagner discussed
fees. Nielson supported Bridwell's version of the fee
discussion held in Switzerland whereby it was agreed
that the fees would be revised, and stated at R. 27 4:
"A. and Mr. Bridwell says, he says,
'Frank .. .'
And Mr. Wagner was there.
He says, 'You will remember this because it
may be important some day that Mr. Wagner
owes me substantial fees on this case, Mr. 'Vagner m\·es me ~;u b~;~antial fees on this case and
there's additional fees ~hat wm be charged in
connection with the corporatiou.'
And I remember that individually because of
the fact that George emphasized that to me as
they came into the room.
7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Q. Now, what did Mr. Wagner say to this?
-

A. Mr. Wagner didn't say anything. He just
silent acknowledgment.

Q. Was he close enough so that he could ha Ye
heard this easily enough?
A. Mr. Bridwell brought Mr. Wagner into
the room specifically to say this in front of me.
That's the only subject that was brought my
attention to."

During the course of this stay in Switzerland, Nielson audited the corporation bank account, and he and
Bridwell prepared a voluminous affidavit outlining the
history of the company in the United States and its
connection with Wagner, together with attachments of
bank statements. The affidavit outlined that \iVagner
had embezzled certain monies from the corporation
which he would pay back, which was the basis for a
theory of minimizing tax liability for embezzled money.
Bridwell represented to the I.R.S. agents that this affidavit would be signed by the principals involved. Howeyer, he and Nielson left on a weekend with the understanding that the affidavit would be signed and forwarded to be presented to I.R.S. However, this affidavit was never in fact signed (Ex. E ) .
The expenses for the trip were primarily obtained
from $4,000.00 paid back to the company from Metropolitan Finance as final payment on a loan which Precisa made to Metropolitan Finance.

8
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Bridwell testified that not only was the $4,000.00
used up for trip expenses for himself and Nielson, but
some money in addition had been drawn while there
for additional expenses (R. 331, 332). Also from this
money, Bridwell hired a public stenographer to assist
with their work ( R. 371). Bridwell and Nielson
believed that they had kept complete records as to
all of the expenses in view of the fact that these
trip expenses were ultimately approved by l.R.S. in
the settlement of the tax cases (R. 319, 320, 321) (Ex.
35).
Shortly after the return from the trip to Switzerland in February 1958, Nielson mailed to Wagner a
financial statement concerning Precisa Calculating Machine Co. as of December 31, 1957 (Ex. 34A). Following the trip, Bridwell and Nielson continued to work
on these cases and Bridwell filed a Petition in the Tax
Com·t which was tentatively set for trial in the Fall
Term of 1959. The Government made a motion to
continue the case and it was.
During this period of time Bridwell contacted
~ 'V ashington attorney at his own expense for assistance
in Washington (R. 354). Ultimately, the Tax Court
convened in Salt Lake City and Bridwell appeared and
argued against the Government's motion for a continuance. He also explored the possibilitites of obtaining
depositions and copies of records in Paris or Switzerland ( R. 354) .
9
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Bridwell also conferred from time to time with a
lawyer from the Regional Counsel's office in San
Francisco.
In the meantime, because of lack of funds in the
corporate bank account, the corporation was unable to
continue making its monthly payments on the building
and the contract went into defa ult in June 1958 (Ex.
24). As a result, a lawsuit was filed on behalf of the
owners of the building for the purpose of cancelling the
contract. Bridwell prevailed upon counsel for the Plaintiffs in that case, Mr. Bernstein, to grant to Precisa
an option to purchase back the building within one year.
Prior to this time, Bridwell had made application to
the District Director of Internal Revenue to discharge
the Oren Romney property from the tax lien so that
the Romneys could pay the balance off to Precisa Calculating Machine Co. and expressly stated in said Petition, that this was necessary so that Precisa could continue making the monthly payments on the property at
375 'Vest 4th South, Salt Lake City, Utah. This petition was denied (Ex. K, R. 363).
This option was exercised by Robert Schubach, a
friend and client of Bridwell, who to September 1961,
had put his own money into the building to the extent
of $11,370.30. In order to satisfy the Internal Revenue
that this was a bona fide transaction and not a sham,
Bridwell had to obtain an affidavit from Schubach to
this effect (Ex. J) .
IO
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At the time of Bridwell's second trip to Switzerland
in the first part of September 1961, during his conversations with Wagner, he informed Wagner pursuant to
what Schubach had told him prior to the trip, that at
that time Schubach was willing to merely receive his
investment back together with interest. During the conversation, Bridwell gave Wagner a complete breakdown as:
"Initial Payment --------------------------------$ 7,277.10
873.55
1960 Taxes -----------------------------------------Keys ------------------···-···---·-········-···-···-·····
5.64
Insurance ------···---------······-------------------214.08
September 1960 to July 1961
at $250.00/month -----------·-··----------------- 2,750.00
August 1961 ·----------------------·---------------250.00
TOT AL --------------------------------- -------------$11,370.30"
As of that time, neither Wagner nor any of the
principals of Precisa were willing to take Schubach up
on this offer. However, as will be discussed later, there
was language in the corporate minutes to the effect that
the company urged Schubach to give it, Jost or ':V agner
the right to purchase the property back at the market
price ( R. 368) .
During the summer of 1961, Bridwell determined
that it was essential for him to travel to Switzerland
again for the purpose of getting the voluminous aff idavit signed or that failing, at least some sort of a statement from the Company to substantiate the financial
transactions and the loss of the building in order to

11
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solidify the settlements then agreed and the 1957 settlement which was still pending.
The three cases in the Tax Court were settled as
follows:
Case No. 72273, May 29, 1961
Case No. 72274, May 26, 1961
Case No. 73521, May 26, 1961 (R. 435)
However, these settlements did not cover the assessments for 1957. The settlement notices for the 1957
settlement were mailed on October 9, 1961 (R. 436).
Bridwell corresponded with Wagner both by letter
and by telegram and urged Wagner to send him $2,000
for expenses for the trip to Switzerland which Bridwell
felt was essential for the final settlement and termination of the tax matters. Bridwell explained his reasons
as follows (R. 360, 361):
"A. Oh, in my own mind I determined that
it was necessary for protection of everybody
concerned that we get this thing finalized, as I
say, because I'd started having some indications
that I'd probably be successful in getting these
things resolved without going to the Tax Court
in this last case, these last two cases.

Q. They were about at the stage where you
felt they could be A. Yeah. \\Tell, my- my conversations with
these varied people in the Internal Revenue Service, I was pretty confident we could get them
settled. The precise amounts were still disputed,
12
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but - also the items that they disallowed. Now,
I thought I could resolve it provided we had
something to back it up that couldn't subsequently be upset in the - the later cases as well
as the ones that had been settled in the Tax
Court couldn't be upset upon the basis of misrepresentations.
Q. Did you feel that there was any jeopardy
of the settlements that had already been made
being upset?

A. Well, Mr. Black, I have to go back in
point of time now and I hope I can make myself
clear on this. You've got to re-orient yourself.
The circumstances that existed at the time W3re
this was a mysterious fraud case and you just
never knew. As I said in the beginning, I had
an idea there was an informant. I was never
able to substantiate it. I wanted things tied up
for the benefit of Mr. Wagner, people at the
factory and myself."
Bridwell arrived in Switzerland and immediately
turned over the accountings and settlements to 'V'agner
( Exs. 33, 35). At a later date, after Wagner had been
able to go through the accountings and study them,
\V agner and Bridwell had what was described by both
as a heated discussion at Bridwell's hotel room. 'Vagner
testifying from his notes concerning the dates, having
reconstructed same from his diary, stated that the conversation which lasted some seven hours took place on
September 6, 1961 (R. 66). At this heated discussion,
\V agner made various accusations and the entire series
of events was discussed, and Bridwell brought Wagner
13
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completely up-to-date on the building transaction. Eventually, the two of them made their peace and Bridwell
prepared in his own handwriting corporate minutes to
be submitted to the corporation and a general power
of attorney. Wagner then typed u_p the minutes and
power of attorney for presentation to the Board of Directors. Wagner not only typed these documents but
also hired a local lawyer, Dr. Alfred Weierz, to help
explain to the members of the Board why it was advisable to sign them (R. 83, 84) (Exs. 18, ISA, 19, 19A,
19B).
Exhibit 19A is the original _signed minutes of the
Stockholders' Meeting at Zurich, Switzerland on September 8, 1961, and Exhibit 19B is a copy of the power
of attorney which was signed and executed at the same
meeting.
A study of the minutes of this meeting reveals a
full and complete disclosure of all that Bridwell had
done in these cases concerning payment of fees and costs
to himself and Nielson and the building transaction
with Schubach, and contains a complete ratification by
Precisa A.G., Ernst Jost and Eugene Wagner. In
addition, Precisa A.G., Jost and Wagner signed the
general power of attorney giving Bridwell power
to wind up the tax cases. The general power of
attorney further contained language ratifying and
confirming everything that Bridwell had done to date
and shall do by virtue of these presents.

14
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The minutes specifically ratified and consented to
all travel expenses, accounting fees and legal fees, as
reflected by the accountings prepared by Frank Nielson and approved of the $2,000 which Wagner had
sent to Bridwell prior to his trip to Switzerland. The
minutes further stated:

"It is understood there are further substantial
fees, validly and avowedly due as a corporate
obligation for legal and accounting services rendered and to be rendered, to George E. Bridwell
and Franl-c Nielson, and George E. Bridwell
shall be and he hereby is authorized to make
and authorize such corporate obligation and payment therefor as he may deem fit, in accord herewith and in accord with the General Power of
Attorney to be given him as is hereinafter set
forth in this Resolution."
In addition, the minutes outlined the details as to
the loss of the building and stated that the contract
with ]\fr. and Mrs. Hines went delinquent and that the
corporation had no funds to pay thereon, and further,
that requests for loans of the corporation to save the
contract were unfulfilled and none of us were willing
to risk further investment and money in the Company
at that time because of the large outstanding tax assessment and uncertainty as to outcome. Furthermore, it
was stated in regard to the building that at the time
set to exercise the option the Company had no money
and none of us would have loaned money to exercise
it. And that under possessed authority counsel exercised
the option for the Company, then for the Company
15
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he conveyed the right to Robert M. Schubach which
we ratify; "It didn't harm us as we had no funds available." The minutes further stated that Schubach is a
close friend of Bridwell and that Bridwell is his attorney and that they commended Schubach for his courage
in advancing such sums at great risk. The minutes
further acknowledged that the building is and would
be lost to the Company and that the Company acknowledges it and affirms it. In addition, the minutes requested counsel to ask Schubach to give the Company,
Jost or Wagner first right of refusal to purchase or
lease the building at the same terms as any bona fide
offer he may receive and desires to take.
After returning from the trip to Switzerland,
Bridwell completed the settlement of the tax cases and
notified Wagner that he could return to this country
without fear of prosecution. (Ex. 17 Letter Bridwell
to 'Vagner, dated October 27, 1961}
Prior to the trip in September 1961, on May 19,
1961, Bridwell wrote a letter to Wagner informing
him in detail as to what had happened to the building
and of the fact that Schubach at that time would be
willing to get his money back together with a profit
for the risk he had undertaken. Bridwell in the same
letter asked Wagner to find out what Jost and Precisa
A.G. would desire to do with the building. (Ex. 5)
After the final settlement of the cases on Octo her
9, 1961, Bridwell received a refund from the Govern16
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ment in the amount of $15,520. 70 which he disbursed
as follows:
Property Taxes for Eugene
_Wagner property --------------------------------$1,392.34
N 1elson, Psarras and Nilson, C.P .A.s__$6, 700.00
George E. Bridwell, balance
of attorney fee -----------··--·-··--·······-···----$7,428.36
Bridwell testified that he informed Wagner orally
of the disbursal of this refund shortly after Wagner
came back ( R. 376) .
After returning, Wagner, through a process of
negotiation with Schubach, purchased the building from
Schubach for the total sum of $35,000.00. Wagner
paid Schubach cash except for a promissory note of
$2,657.19, dated December 11, 1961 (Ex. 23). Schubach made a profit of better than $10,000.00 on this
transaction. Bridwell received nothing from this transaction ( R. 379) .
Schubach supported Bridwell's testimony that he
had at a prior time offered the property back to Wagner
for what he had invested plus some interest (R. 145).
Schubach further testified that Bridwell made nothing
from the property transaction ( R. 125) .
In support of the blanket charge made by Wagner
that Bridwell had failed to account for monies collected
by Dunn & Bradstreet for Presica and Otto Bock,
Wagner went to Dunn & Bradstreet on November 20,
1961 and examined their records concerning collections
17
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made for Precisa. Although he was ready to accuse
Bridwell of failing to account for large sums he came
up with three checks which were deposited in Bridwell's account. One dated 12-16-58 for $225.50, one
dated 7-21-59 for $79.00 and one dated 8-7-59 for
$78.44, totalling $382.94. Bridwell had no memory
of these checks when he was confronted with them for
the first time at the hearing of this matter. 'Vagner,
instead of taking the checks and confronting Bridwell
with them at the time he discovered them, withheld the
checks for use in the hearing.
Bridwell's contention is that had he been confronted with these checks while his memory was clear,
that he would have had a satisfactory explanation.
His contention further is that there must have been a
satisfactory explanation because Bridwell does not steal
money from clients.
Further, Bridwell testified that there were many
items which have never been accounted with Wagner
concerning money which Bridwell advanced and was
never repaid. Bridwell testified that he loaned $650
to Wagner's ex-wife, Nellie, for which he had never
been repaid, and further, that he had expended sums
of money for telephone calls and cablegrams, not only
on this matter but in regard to the Otto Bock franchise. He made many telephone calls to an attorney
in Minneapolis concerning the Otto Bock franchise for
which he had never been repaid (R. 382). Further,
he hired an attorney in Washington, D.C. to make an
18

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

appearance for which he had never been repaid (R. 381,
382, 404). Also, Bridwell paid with his own money,
a wage claim with the Industrial Commission for an
employee by the name of Richard Lieber of $60 to $70
which was not repaid (R. 406, 407).
'Vagner admitted that he never confronted Bridwell with these checks and that he saved them for the
hearing in the Bar matter. It may be noted that Wagner
had ~he checks for almost a year before he made his complaint to the Bar (R. 249).
It may also be noted that Wagner accused Bridwell
of selling a calculating machine and pocketing the
money which on further investigation turned out to be
a false charge and was accordingly dropped ( R. 250) .
As far as the charge that Bridwell had converted
money loaned to Metroplitan Finance is concerned,
YVagner's own accounting attached to Exhibit 4 shows
a sum of $300 paid which was apparently interest paid
by .Metropolitan Finance Co. on the loan. This money
is entirely accounted for with the $4,000 check which
Bridwell cashed at American Express Co. for travel
expenses for the first trip to Switzerland (Ex. C) (R.
140).

'Vagner charged Bridwell with representing conflicting interests in regard to Bridwell's purchase of
n chandelier at the auction which the Government held
on the property of 'Vagner and Precisa. Wagner
offered no evidence of any kind concerning communica-
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tion with Bridwell prior to the auction and his letters
contained no mention whatsoever of the chandelier
although there was mention made of some books called
The Journal of Discourses. Wagner accuses Bridwell
of some type of misconduct in purchasing this chandelier. Bridwell's testimony stands undisputed to the effect
that his only function in this regard benefitted Wagner.
Bridwell testified that at the auction he was informed
that a man from Salt Lake Light & Fixture Co. had
approached Mr. Doxie who was handling the auction
and had indicated that he would probably be willing
to pay a good price but needed more time to check with
his company. Mr. Doxie approached Bridwell and
asked if a continuance as to this item was agreeable
with him. Bridwell agreed. At that time, Doxie announced to everyone present that the auction on the
chandelier would be held the following day or possibly
at a date more than one day later. At the time set
for the resumption of the auction, the lighting fixture
man informed Doxie that the sale did not materialize
and the auction was carried on. A lady from the Utah
Historical Society bid a high of $145.00 and Bridwell
bid $150.00 for the high bid. Accordingly, Bridwell
received the chandelier, paying for it with his own
funds, and later gave it to a friend (R. 388, 389). This
was the only evidence as to this charge.
The only evidence concerning the charge of using
company bricks in constructing a bar came from recrossexamination by the Bar Prosecutor. Bridwell testified
20
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that he had rented the building to one Joe Looser aml
that Looser did not pay the rental. Looser volunteered
to do some work and Bridwell accepted work done by
him in constructing a bar in his basement with some
used company brick. Bridwell testified that in addition
to the amount owed to the Company he also paid Looser
$200 or $300. Bridwell has at all times been willing
to account to the Company for this but an accounting
was made rather difficult in the face of outright charge3
of embezzlement made by Wagner ( R. 408, 409) .
After the building transaction had been completed,
\Vagner came to Bridwell's office and made accusations of embezzlement. Bridwell told him to get out.
This was the last time that Bridwell saw Wagner.
This conversation occurred shortly after the building
transaction was completed on December 11, 1961 (R.
383, 384). After this, Bridwell corresponded with
Mr. F. Bieler, one of the principals of the Precisa A.G.
parent corporation, and in reply, received a letter from
Mr. Bieler dated March 7, 1962. This letter stated in
part as follows:
"I was rather surprised about the differences
between you and Mr. Wagner. Unfortunately,
Mr. Ernst Jost is still away.
I have had the pleasure of meeting you several
times here in Zurich, and during our discussions
I got the best impression of yourself and I esteemed very much your frank way of dealing
matters. Now I would like to submit you a personal question. Mr. Wagner wants Mr. Jost to
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give him full power regarding all the shares made
out to .Mr. Jost and to Precisa Ltd. Would you
be interested in getting full power from Mr. Jost
with re9·ard to the shares in question? .Mr. Jost
hein~ no~ i~1formed about this letter, I should appreciate It If you would kindly address to me some
personal lines by letting me know your viewpoint
in this matter.
Looking forward to hearing from you at your
convenience, l remain mcamvbile with best personal regards."

It can be seen from the above letter that Wagner's
'testimony indicating that the Precisa people were
unhappy with Bridwell has no foundation. The pleasant,
friendly relationship which Bridwell had with these
peopk is conclusively shown by the above letter where
Bieler is offering to help Bridwell by obtaining a proxy
from Mr. Jost as to his shares.

At the time of oral argument on this matter the
Bar Prosecutor admitted that the Bar had failed to
produce evidence supporting Paragraph III ( e) of the
Complaint, inasmuch as the Bar had failed to prove that
there were funds then available at the time that the
contract for the purchase of the property at 375 'Vest
4th South came into default. The prosecutor then
moved to amend the Complaint to conform to the
evidence so as to charge Bridwell with a conflict of
interest in regard to the building transaction. We objected to this amendment in view of the fact that
Wagner's complaint had been on file for six years.
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The Hearing Committee denied the objection and allowed the amendment.
After hearing and argument and after Bridwell
had submitted a memorandum of authorities in support
of the legal contentions made both in his motion to
dismiss and in argument after hearing, the Disciplinary
Committee made Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law sustaining the allegations of the complaint made
in Paragraph III, sub-paragraphs (a), (b), ( c), (e)
as amended, (g) and (h), and concluded that Bridwell
had violated the Rules of the Utah State Bar governing professional conduct ( R. 17).
The Board of Commissioners of the Utah State
Bar approved the Findings and Conclusions and has
recommended an Order by the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah disbarring George E. Bridwell from
the practice of law.
Bridwell filed an answer to the complaint on April
14, 1967 (R. 4). In said answer, Bridwell prayed for
an immediate hearing on the charges. On July 14, 1967,
Bridwell filed a motion to dismiss the charges for the
rc[lson that he had been denied an immediate hearing
and the Committee had been unable to provide such
(R. 6).

An Order fixing time and place for hearing was
issued on May 27, 1968 setting hearing on the matter
at 9 :00 A.M. on September 9, 1968. At that time,
Bridwell filed an Affidavit in support of the Motion

23
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to Dismiss and counsel for the Bar filed an Affidavit
in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss and said Motion
was argued before the Disciplinary Committee and
denied. Hearing was then held on October 10 and
October 11, 1968, and oral arguments were held on
October 23, 1968. The Findings and Conclusions were
rendered by the Hearing Committee on February 17,
1969.

The affidavit filed by Bridwell in support of the
motion to dismiss revealed the following as the time
schedule of events in this matter:
1. The facts in this case occurred between the 11'all

of 1957 and the Fall of 1961.
2. Wagner filed his letter of complaint to the Bar
on October 1, 1962.
3. On May 6, 1963, H. Wayne Wadsworth, ap-

pointed as investigator by the Bar, asked Bridwell for
a written explanation.
4. On May 16, 1963, Bridwell responded to the

charges with an eight page letter.
5. On August 2, 1963,

,;vadsworth wrote to Brid-

well for further clarification.
6. On October 1, 1963,

Bridwell submitted a

further letter of clarification.
7. On January 31, 1966, the Board of Commis-

sioners of the Utah State Bar ordered that a complaint
be filed against affiant.

24
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8. On April 15, 1966, Bridwell received a letter

from Clifford L. Ashton, Prosecutor, enclosing a copy
of the complaint and stating in part:
"I have not filed any copy with the Bar Commission and intend at the present to keep the
matter strictly confidential."
9. On July 5, 1966, Mr. Ashton, by letter, informed

Bridwell that he was no longer prosecuting and informed him that 'the case was now on file.
10. Bridwell filed his Answer on April 13, 1967

requesting an immediate hearing.
11. In the Affidavit filed by Marvin J. Bertoch,

it appeared that the complaining witness, Eugene
Wagner, returned to Switzerland in early 1966 and
remained until January 1968, and that counsel for the
Bar could not arrange a hearing in January of 1968.
We were not notified of this.
12. It appears from the affidavit of Bridwell, that

,;vagner was out of the country during the time mentioned in Mr. Bertoch's affidavit for the reason that
he was under Federal Charge. He apparently resolved
this matter by January 1968.
From the aforesaid 'time schedule as to the events
that occurred in this case, we have the following conclusions.
1. From October 1, 1962, the date of the letter

of complaint, to January 31, 1966, the date that com-
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plaint was ordered by the Bar, we have a lapse of time
of three years and four months.
2. :From January 31, 1966, the date when the complaint was ordered, to April 15, 1966, the date that the
Bar complaint was filed, there is a lapse of two and onehalf months.
3. From April 15, 1966, the date that formal complaint was filed, to September 9, 1968, the date of hear-

ing, there is a lapse of time of two years, four months
and twenty-four days.
4. From the date of April 13, 1967, the date when

formal demand for an immediate hearing was made,
to September 9, 1968, the date of hearing, there is a
lapse of time in the amount of one year, four months
and twenty-four days.
5. From the date of \7\Tagner's letter of complaint,
October 1, 1962, to the hearing date, September 9,
1968, there is a lapse of time of slightly less than

six years.
In support of the credibility of George Bridwell
as a witness, affidavits were submitted from six of the
seven Judges of the Third Judicial District Court
attesting to Bridwell's good reputation for truth and
veracity from more than 15 years' acquaintance.
In addition to this, similar testimony attesting to
Bridwell's good reputation in the community for truth
and veracity was elicited from Sam Bernstein ( R. 341 )
and Sumner Hatch (R. 350).
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As far as Wagner was concerned, Hatch testified
that he had represented Wagner, and, there being no
objection as to the privilege, the Committee allowed
Hatch to testify as to Wagner's reputation for truth
and veracity in the community which he testified was
poor (R. 349).
l n addition to this, 'i\T agner had also threatened
to make a complaint to the bar on Hatch which Hatch
immediately forwarded to the bar, this resulting from
a collection matter which Hatch had handled for
'" agner ( R. 260). Wagner also accused his ex-wife,
Nellie 'i\Tagner, of embezzling money (R. 259). Wagner accused the agents from the I.R.S. who interviewed
him of being dishonest (R. 220). Wagner also complained that the Government was blackmailing him
(R. 324).

ARGUMENT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In presenting the argument on the facts and the
law in this case, we urge the Court to review the facts
in the light of the law concerning the burden of proof
which the bar has. The charges should be "clearly
sustained by convincing proof." See In re McCull01igh
(1939) 97 Utah 533, 95 P.2d 13; In re Hanson (1916)
48 Utah 163, 158 P. 778; and In re Evans and Rogers,
22 Utah 366, 62 P. 913, where the Court stated:
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"The summary proceeding of disbarment is
civil, and not criminal. In that proceeding, however, more than a preponderance of the evidence
is required. The guilt of the attorney must be

thoroughly cstµblished."
In the case of In re Reily ( 1919) 75 Okl. 192, 183 P.
728, the Court stated at p. 730:
"The serious consequences of disbarment
should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of the evidence against the respondent.
In such proceeding the attorney sought to be
disbarred is presumed to be innocent of the
charges preferred, and to have performed his
duty as an officer of the Court in accordance
with his oath, and the evidence in support of
the charges must satisfy the court to a reasonable
certainty that the charges are true and warrant
a judgment of disbarment."
The Court further stated:
"The law does not demand that every technical
infraction of the law by an attorney shall require
his disbarment, although an attorney should endeavor to observe literally the law; but it is those
infractions of duty by an attorney that involve
moral turpitude and evince a depraved character,
rendering such attorney untrustworthy and a
reflection upon the bar and the Court, as an
officer thereof, that demand his disbarment."
In the case of Browne v. State Bar of California
(1955) 45 Cal.2d 165, 287 P.2d 745, the Court held that
in a disciplinary proceeding against an attorney any

reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the attar-
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ney; citing Golden v. State Bar, 213 Cal. 237, 2 P.2d
325, and also quoting from Hildebrand v. Stµte Bar, 18
Cal.2d 816, 117 P.2d 860:
"In proceedings of this character where the
evidence is conflicting, as is shown to be the fact
herein, the findings of the local administrative
committee and of the Board of Bar Governors
are not necessarily binding on this Court."
In considering whether or not the Bar has sustained
its burden of proof as outlined above, we wish to remind
the Court that George E. Bridwell has been a lawyer
in good standing in the State of Utah since the year
1949. We are sure that the Court is aware of the serious
nature of these proceedings and the drastic results that
the findings of the Board of Commissioners has inflicted
on the life and career of George E. Bridwell.
'Ve submit, as will be pointed out in the argument,
that the prosecution has not even come close to sustaining its burden of proof, and that many of the charges
are petty, nit-picking charges resulting from a shotgun
a pp roach by the complaining witness.
POINT I. THE UNCONSCIONABLE DELAY FROM ORIGINAL COMPLAINT BY
'VAGNER TO HEARING REQUIRES DISMISSAL OF ALL CHARGES.
(A) BRIDWELL WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RI G H T TO A
SPEEDY TRIAL.
29
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The file in this case shows that there was a lapse of
t}iree years and four months from initial complaint by
Wagner to the date when a complaint was ordered
by the Bar Corrunission. The file shows that there was
less than one month short of six years from initial complaint to the hearing on this matter. The evidence at
the hearing in this matter involved intricate transactions, records, letters and conversations which occurred
from the Fall of 1957 to the Fall of 1961. The facts
in this case were from seven to eleven years old at the
time of the hearing.
The Supreme Court of the United States has
recently held that lawyers are entitled to the same
Fourteenth Amendment rights as any other person.
The Supreme Court has specifically held that speedy
trial is a Constituional right included in the Fourteenth Amendment.

The case of Spevack v. Klein (1967) 385 U.S. 511,
87 S.Ct. 625, held that lawyers in disbarment proceedings were entitled to Fourteenth Amendment rights.
In that case the basis for disbarment involved the
refusal of the attorney to produce demanded financial
records and to testify at the judicial inquiry on the basis
that the production of records and testimony would
tend to incriminate him. The Court held that the Fifth
Amendment protection against self-incrimination applies to lawyers in state disbarment proceedings pur- i
suant to the Fourteenth Amendmen't which incorporates the Fifth Amendment. The Court stated in part
as follows:
30
1
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"* * *

ship."

lawyers also enJoy first class citizen-

and again at p. 627:
"We conclude that Cohen v. Hurley should
be overruled, that the Self-Incrimination Clause
of the :Fifth Amendment has been absorbed in
the Fourteenth, that it extends its protection to
lawyers as well as to other individuals, and that
it. should not be watered down by imposing the
dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of a
livelihood as a price for asserting it."
Also, see In re Ruffalo (1968) 390 U.S. 544, 88
S.Ct. 1222, and In re Schlesi,nger (1961) 404 Pa.
584, 172 A.2d 835, where it was stated:
"The right to practice law is Constitutionally
protected as a property right and no attorney
can lawfully be deprived of such right except
by clue process of law and upon competent and
relevent proofs sufficiently credible to support
a just order of disbarment."
In the case of Klopfer v. State of North Carolina
(1967) 386 U.S. 213, 87 St.Ct. 988, the Supreme Court
of the United States held that the right to a speedy
trial is guaranteed to defendants in state courts pursuant to the Sixth Amendment which is held to be
included within the Fourteenth Amendment protections. The Court stated in par't at p. 993:
"\Ve hold here that the right to a speedy trial
is as fundainental as any of the rights secured
by the Sixth Amendment. That right has its
roots at the very foundation of our English law
heritage."
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There can be no question if the Court holds that
Bridwell in this proceeding was entitled, the same as
any person under criminal charge, to a speedy trial,
that that right was violated in this case. Six years from
original complaint by complaining witness to hearing
must surely violate the right to a speedy trial. 'Ve can
further point out that as soon as Bridwell's answer was
filed in this matter on April 13, 1967, we specifically
demanded an immediate hearing and were not given
one for one year, four months and 24 days. There can
be no question that Bridwell was greatly prejudiced
by this unconscionable delay.
It is obvious that the facts were six years older at
the time of hearing than they were at the time of
complaint. Throughout the record when specifics were
asked Bridwell concerning the existence or absence of
letters, Bridwell had to answer many times that he
remembered some letters but could not find all of his
files. He went through two changes of law partnership
during this time. Mr. Doxie, who conducted the auction, is deceased. The three checks which Wagner
obtained from Dunn & Bradstreet and withheld to the
time of hearing, were shown to Bridwell for the very
first time at the hearing, approximately seven years
after Wagner had first obtained them. They were nearly
ten years old at the time of the hearing.

The entire responsibility for providing a speedy
trial to an accused lawyer rests on the shoulders of the
Bar Commission. This responsibility cannot be avoided
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or delegated. Bridwell has no duty with respect to it.
As stated at 21 Am.Jur.2d 279:
"No court has any discretionary power to deny
an accused person a right so important. Both
the court and the prosecution are under a positive duty to prevent unreasonable delay, and the
granting of a speedy trial is not a matter to be
determined by the trial judge in the exercise
of an uncontrolled personal discretion."
Further speaking of the basis for this right, it is further
stated at 21 Am.Jur.2d 279:

"* * * it relieves him of the anxiety and public
suspicion attendant upon an untried accusation
of crime; and, like statutes of limitation, it prevents him from being exposed to the hazard of
a trial after the lapse of so great a time that the
means of proving his innocence may have been
lost."
Although it is obvious that Bridwell has been greatly
prejudiced by being deprived of a speedy trial, we
contend that when a person is deprived of a fundamental constitutional right, prejudice is presumed.
On this basis alone all charges should be dismissed.
(B) THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES
MANDS DISMISSAL.

DE-

Courts have accepted the doctrine of laches as
applicable to disciplinary proceedings against an attorney (see 7 Am.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, Paragraph
62) . The reason for applying the doctrine of laches
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are the same as those involved in giving an attorney the
constitutional right to a speedy trial. An attorney is
greatly prejudiced in his ability to defend because of
the loss of records and other evidence, and the staleness of the evidence cannot help but prejudice an
attorney called to answer charges. This is especially
true where we have an unscrupulous complaining witness preparing and constructing the evidence in minute
detail as appears here.
The Utah Supreme Court has at least recognized
that the doctrine of !aches may be applicable in a disciplinary proceedings. See In re Steffensen (1938) 9~
Utah 436, 78 P.2d 531.
In the instant case, because of the intricacy of the
transactions associated with the charges, their complexity and the loss of records and evidence, the concept
of laches is readily applicable.
Cases from other jurisdictions based on similar
contentions lend support to the conclusion that the
doctrine should be recognized by the Court in this case.
Proceedings instituted a long time after the commission
of an alleged act of misconduct by an attorney "are
regarded with disfavor." The Court in State v. Haggerty (1942) 241 Wisc. 486, 6 N.W.2d 203, stated in
part as fallows:
" 'However, proceedings instituted after a
great lapse of time from the commission of the
act complained of are regarded with disfavor,
and the Court may refuse to hear an application
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to disbar that has been unreasonably delayed.'
5 Am.Jur. p. 434, par. 288; see also 2 Thornton
on Attorneys at Law, Sec. 880."
The court in Columbus Bar Association v. Teaford
( 1966) 6 Ohio St.2d 253, 35 Ohio Opin.2d 318, 117
N.E.2d 872, recognized the reason for not favoring old
claims, stating:
"Records may be destroyed an;l recollections
may be hazy. It is for this reason that the prosecution of old claims is not favored. See 7 Am.
J ur.2d 86, Attorneys at Law, Sec. 62."
The case of Murrell v. Florida Bar (Fla. 1960)
122 So.2d 169, dismissed a disciplinary action against
an attorney where the investigation had been pending
for five years. This is a shorter period of time than is
involved at the case at bar. The court stated:
" ( 1) We are confronted here with a disciplinary proceeding that has been under investigation for five years or longer. The disciplinary
rule requires that all investigations and hearings
of disciplinary cases shall be begun, prosecuted,
and completed as promptly as the ends of justice
will permit. 'All investigations and hearings shall
be informal but thorough, with the object of
ascertaining the truth.' This is a most essential
requirement, the reason being that the minute
such a proceeding is instituted the lawyer's professional reputation is shadowed and in danger
of being permanently impaired. Such charges
should not be suspended in limbo. They should
be dispatched and if found to be without merit,
the lawyer charged should be exonerated. * * * *
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~

I

( 2) This record, partly narrated in this opinion, convinces every member of this Court that
these proceedings have gone far enough. To
continue would amount to no more than harassment and would constitute an abuse of the powers
given this Court and its commissions under Section 23 of Article V of the Constitution, F.S.A."

Also see In re Ratner (1965) 194 Kan. 362, 399 P.2d
865; and The Jllorida Bar v. King (Fla. 1965) 174 So.
2d 398. The Court in the King case made some observations which appear to be pertinent in the case at bar
as follows:

"We are now confronted with the question of
whether or not we should further damage respondent by taking away from him his profession
of thirty-nine years' standing. He has suffered
degradation and humiliation, the loss of re-election to the senate, as well as the presidency of
the senate, the loss of $10,000.00 and the torment
of being under criminal prosecution for a number of years. In spite of this, according to all
of the evidence presented, he has at all times
since that episode nine years ago conducted himself in an exemplary manner as a man and as
a lawyer. The testimony reflects that since this
occasion, he has given his clients 'gold-plated'
service in his legal representation of them. He i
has the support of every circuit judge of his cir- ,
cuit, as well as the bar of that area. In addition,
other prominent and substantial non-lawyer citizens appeared in his behalf.
1

!

( 3) In spite of the respondent's gross misconduct of nine years ago, we believe that by his
subsequent exemplary conduct he has earned the
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right to continue to serve his profession. We
believe that he will at all times in the future
~onduct himself in such manner as to rectify,
msofar as he can, the blemish that he has placed
upon his record. If we did not think so, we would
agree with the Board of Governors and sustain
the order of disbarment. Under the circumstances heretofore related, however, we consider
disbarment or suspension at this late date to be
excessive."
The above Courts have recognized that unconscionable delay in invoking disciplinary proceedings
warrants dismissal of the proceeding. The proceedings
are not intended to punish the attorney but merely to
insure that the public will be provided with the quality
of legal service the Bar has traditionally provided. We
think that Bridwell has been punished enough by having these proceedings hanging over his head for seven
years. Bridwell has the support of lawyers and judges
in this area and has at all times, before, during and
since his period of representing Wagner, conducted
himself in an exemplary manner. This must not be lost
sight of.
(C) THIS PROCEEDING VIOLATES THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
The last incident mentioned in the testimony concerning conduct of Bridwell from which charges were
made occurred in December of 1961 when Bridwell
prepared the promissory note. The complaint was filed
against Bridwell by the Bar on ApriJ 15, 1966, more
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than four years later. We contend that the complaint
violates the Statute of Limitations having to do with
"special proceedings." Section 78-12-25 U.C.A. 1953,
sub-par. 2 provides for a four year Statute of Limitations where an action (special proceedings) is not other- '
wise specifically provided for in the article. Section
78-12-33 U.C.A. 1953, provides that the Statute of
Limitations prescribed in the Judicial Code is applicable
in instances where the action is brought in the name
of or "for the benefit of the state." The Utah State
Bar Association is an integrated bar and is an arm
of the State of Utah. Actions brought by it are therefore actions for the benefit of the State. Section 78-12.J.6 U.C.A. 1953, provides " 'action' includes special ,
proceeding. - The word 'action', as used in this chap- 1
ter, is to be construed, whenever it is necessary to do
so, as including a special proceeding of a civil nature."
1

In Crystal Car Line v. State 1'ax Commission,
no Utah 426, 174 P.2d 984, the Utah Supreme
Court stated that a special proceeding under the quoted
section applied to proceedings of quasi-judicial bodies
where the rights of parties are determined, including
those actions which were unknown at common law.
Disciplinary proceedings are special proceedings. In re
Stice, 184 Kan. 589, 339 P.2d 29; In re Burnette (1906)
73 Kan. 609, 95 P. 575; In re Sherman (Wash.) 363
P.2d 390; and Spriggs v. The Bar, 61 Wyo. 70, 155
P.2d 285.
In Brotsky v. State Bar of California (1962) 57

38

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Cal.2d 287, 368 P.2d 697, the California Supreme Court
ruled that provisions and statutory principles relating
to civil actions were applicable in disbarment proceedings. The Court, although not specifically concerned
with a Statute of Limitations problem, stated a rule
which would require the application of a limitations
statute in disciplinary cases.
"Since the State bar acts as an arm of the
court, its activity should be governed by those
statutory principles which have been enacted as
rules of procedure for all courts. By whatever
name a disciplinary proceeding is called, whether
an action or special proceeding, it is in essence
the initial stage of an action in court."
The instant action arises out of the statutory
authority granted to the Utah State Bar under Section
78-51-12 U.C.A. 1953. Consequently, the action is a
special proceeding, civil in nature, to which normal limitation provisions should apply. The policy reasons,
precluding stale actions in civil proceedings, are equally
as applicable to disciplinary proceedings as to other
civil cases. Accordingly, we submit that the Statute of
Limitations above cited requires dismissal of all charges.
POINT II. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT
SUPPORT THE FINDINGS.
(A) CREDIBILITY

It is submitted that the Bar has not sustained its
burden of proof in respect to any of the findings of
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unprofessional conduct. This is especially true in vie·w
of the evidence in the record reflecting on the lack of
credibility of the complaining witness Wagner and the
evidence in the record which supports the credibility
of George E. Bridwell.
Sumner Hatch testified that in his opinion Wagner's
reputation for truth and veracity in this area is poor.
Wagner's performance on the witness stand lent credence to Hatch's testimony.
On the other hand there was testimony of lawyers
and of all the District Judges in Salt Lake County,
except one who was out of the area, that Bridwell's
reputation for truth and veracity in this area is good.
This basic fact cannot be overlooked in reviewing the
evidence in this file.
Wagner is a man of extremely meticulous habits
in preparing and recalling facts. As a matter of fact,
he had gone to the trouble of completely reviewing a
diary and listing all of the dates in chronological order
which he thought important in this matter to refresh
his recollection while testifying. Also Wagner testified expansively as to his qualifications as a bookkeeper.
Yet, this meticulous bookkeeper would have the Court
believe that he did not even know that Bridwell was
paying himself attorney fees from the Company bank
account when the statements were sent monthly to
the Company address in Salt Lake City and presumably forwarded to Wagner. This same man would have
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the Court believe that he had no knowledge of what
Bridwell did with the refund from the Government
when the matter of the refund was discussed in the
letter of October 12, 1961, when part of the refund
was used to pay property taxes on property belonging
to Wagner, and when Wagner, on coming back to this
country from Switzerland, talked to Bridwell on
numerous occasions. Bridwell testified that he told
Wagner specifically about what was done with the
refund and how he had paid himself, the accountant
and 'V agner's property taxes. Yet Wagner would have
us believe that he never even discussed this matter with
Bridwell during the conversations prior to the time that
he and Bridwell had their split.
This same meticulous man testified in great detail
concerning his meeting with Bridwell when Bridwell
came to Switzerland for the second time, the first
part of September, 1961. Wagner, using his notes
to refresh his memory, was certain that when Bridwell first arrived he merely gave the records to Wagner. Wagner then studied the records for some days
and then, on September 6, 1961, had the "heated
discussion" with Bridwell in Bridwell's hotel room
taking seven hours. He stated that after they had
made their peace, he assisted Bridwell in typing the
minutes and the general power of attorney. Then,
on September 8, Wagner assisted Bridwell in convincing the Board of Directors of Precisa A.G. that
these minutes and general power of attorney should be
41
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signed. Yet, in an entirely self-serving letter, written
in the Swiss language, admitted over objection (Ex.
21), Wagner complained to his attorney friend in
Switzerland as to what Bridwell was doing to him and
the Company. At the bottom of the letter he stated that
enclosed was the power of attorney and minutew. Also,
there was some handwriting along the border mentioning some further suspicions which 'V agner had of the
reason why Bridwell needed these documents.
The importance of this document can readily be
seen from the fact that Wagner needed some type of
an explanation as to why he had not only agreed to
sign the minutes and the general power of attorney
but actually typed them up and obtained the assistance
of a local lawyer to help persuade the Board of Directors to sign the same. However, it appears that this
self-serving letter v;as dat2d Sc;;/crn 1·t;· 2, 1961. No
satisfactory explanation was given f~r this basic inconsistency in Wagner's testimony. It stands to reaso:1
that 'Vagner could not have had the minutes and
general power of attorney typed up on September 2
when he specifically recalled, having reconstructed the
dates from his diary, that his heated discussion was held
with Bridwell on September 6, and that it was following this that ~he minutes and power of attorney were
typed.
In addition to this, Wagner presented another
self-serving letter (Ex. 41) which he allegedly wrote
to Bridwell on December 25, 1961, outlining the entire
42
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series of events from his point of view and expressing
them to his own advantage. Wagner testified that this
lengthy letter was a handwritten letter. Bridwell denied
ever having received such a letter from Wagner and
from all that appears in the record, every other letter
written by Wagner was a typewrit.ten letter. Yet, the
copy of this voluminous, handwritten letter which Wagner allegedly made on December 25, 1961, was a typewritten copy. It certainly appears to us $trange that
'V agner would go to the trouble of writing such a letter
in his own handwriting and then type a copy of the
letter for his own files. It is interesting to note that even
in this self-serving letter of December 25, 1961, Wagner
affirmed that fees to the time of the second trip to
Switzerland had been agreed upon but that he did not
feel that Bridwell should receive any further fees. Also,
he expresses the desire to have Bridwell's signature on
company checks in the future, and this at a time when
according to Wagner, he felt that Bridwell had cheated
him and the corporation and had engaged in all sorts
of unprofessional conduct.
In addition to this, Wagner testified that the
members of the Board of Directors in Switzerland were
reluctant to sign the minutes and inferred that they
had the same view of Bridwell as he did. This testimony
was rendered unreliable by Exhibit L, which was a
letter to Bridwell from one of the Board members, Mr.
Rieler, dated March 7, 1962, which expressed great
trust in Bridwell and a willingness to help Bridwell
by attempting to get him 'the power to vote the shares
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of Mr. Jost, the majority shareholder. This letter
paints a completely different picture of Bridwell's relationship with the Company than Wagner would like
the Bar to have.
The above inconsistencies in Wagner's testimony
plus direct evidence of unreliability as a witness, militates in favor of Bridwell and against Wagner. In
view of this, it is utterly incomprehensible that the
Hearing Committee in this action could have resolved
every dispute between Bridwell and Wagner in Wagner's favor (and in one case even against the only evidence in the record-chandelier incident), especially
in view of the fact that Bridwell had independent witnesses, Frank Nielson and Robert Schubach, who supported his testimony.
(B) USING THREATS TO EXTRACT ADDITIONAL FEES.
The Hearing Committee made a finding that Bridwell used threats and coercion to extract an additional
fee of $2,000.00 with no emergency circumstances existing. In making this finding, the Committee found
against the evidence, logic and legal common sense.
The true fact of the matter was that Bridwell, who
represented Wagner and the corporation throughout
this rather involved proceeding, felt that it was necessary to make the second trip to Switzerland in order
to complete the settlement of these cases which had
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already been agreed upon and to settle the 1957 case
which was still open.
Bridwell testified that in his opinion this trip was
necessary in order to attempt to get the voluminous
affidavit signed or that failing, to obtain something in
writing from the corporation to substantiate the representations which had been made to the l.R.S. Bridwell testified that until the matter was completely
finished it could have been upset at any time if the
people in I.R.S. had any doubts as to any representations which had been made. He was especially concerned with the building transaction, that the l.R.S.
may get suspicious as to whether or not the Schubach
arrangement was legitimate and that Schubach was
a true purchaser of the building.
In the face of this direct testimony by Bridwell,
we have Wagner's testimony that he knew of no reason
why Bridwell needed to make the trip. The Hearing
Committee resolved the dispute in favor of Wagner
and against Bridwell in spite of the fact that Bridwell
testified as a respected attorney and "with the presumption of innocence", as to the need for this trip.
As far as using threats and coercion is concerned,
the telegrams and letters sent to Wagner were merely
an attempt to impress upon Wagner the importance of
the trip. In the course of this correspondence, Bridwell
threatened to withdraw from the case and allow \Vagner
to obtain other counsel. Certainly, there can be nothing
wrong with this. We assume that any lawyer has the
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right at any time to withdraw from a case if his client
does not cooperate with him. We certainly have to
stretch the imagination and warp common sense to
arrive at any kind of a conclusion that Bridwell from
Salt Lake City could coerce and force Wagner in
Switzerland to do anything against his will. Wagner
testified that he had independent legal advice in Switzerland and certainly the advice of the Board of Directors
of Precisa, and for the Hearing Committee to hold
that Bridwell could completely overwhelm and coerce
all of these people against their will to send money for
him to come to Switzerland is ridiculous.
We are sure that all lawyers have had experience
with clients who were reluctant to follow our advice.
On many occasions a lawyer must use forceful language in order to persuade a client to take advice which
he knows is for the client's own best interest. Certainly,
no one in this proceeding has made any argument
against the success that Bridwell achieved in his representation of Wagner and Precisa. Even Wagner
does not quarrel with the success of settling tax liability
in excess of $700,000 for a little over $30,000, which was
achieved in this case.
BridweII felt that the trip was necessary in order
to successfully complete the tax cases. He informed
Wagner in strong language that the trip was necessary.
Wagner did send the $2,000 which incidentally was
not an additional fee but was for Bridwell's costs of
going to Switzerland and back and living in Switzer-
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land while there. We feel that it is incomprehensible
that anybody, judicial, quasi-judicial or otherwise, can
find any improper conduct in regard to this charge.
'Vagner, a man who is schooled in business and with
much experience in bookkeeping and business matters,
certainly did not have to send the $2,000 if he did not
want to. Certainly, if Bridwell chose to withdraw from
this case he had the right to do so and Wagner could
have been perfectly free to hire new counsel. However,
'V agner chose to stay with Bridwell, a wise decision
in this matter, and Bridwell successfully completed the
case.

In addition, in the minutes which Wagner and the
corporation signed, they all specifically ratified the
trip and the $2,000 which was sent to Bridwell. In
addition to this, in the self-serving letter of December
25, 1961 (Ex. 14), Wagner stated that he agreed and
accepted all fees and costs which had been paid to the
date of the minutes.
'Ve submit that this finding by the Hearing Committee is without merit, is not supported by the evidence
in this case, and does not comport with logic and common sense. 'Ve ask again what could possibly be wrong
or what could possibly violate the ethics of the Bar in
regard to this charge? The charge is unfounded and
ridiculous in the extreme.
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(C) FAILING TO ACCOUNT FOR FUNDS
RECEIVED.
This charge involves the placing of three checks
by Bridwell, received from Dunn & Bradstreet, into his
own account.
At the outset we wish to remind the Court that
Bridwell was not shown these checks until the day of
the hearing, although Wagner had these checks in his
possession from 1961. Indeed, Wagner had these checks
in his possession for nearly a year before he made his
complaint to the Bar. 'Vagner did not choose to show
these checks to Bridwell and to ask for an explanation.
Our contentoin is that had he done so while the facts
were fresh, Bridwell's explanation would have been
good.
Bridwell testified that there were many times when
he advanced money out of his own pocket for Wagner's
benefit. Bridwell testified that there never was a complete accounting with Wagner for monies which he
had advanced. Bridwell loaned Wagner's ex-wife,
Nellie, the sum of $650.00 for which he was not repaid.
He advanced sums of money for telephone calls and
cablegrams for which he was not repaid. He hired a
vV ashington lawyer to make an appearance in Washington for which he was not repaid. He paid a wage
claim against Precisa for which he was not repaid.
Yet, the Hearing Committee has found that Bridwell
did not properly account for these monies received, m
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spite of the fact that there was never any accounting
made between Wagner and Bridwell for the various
things discussed above. Certainly Wagner's secretion of
these checks make his motives questionable to say the
least.
We submit that Bridwell' s explanation is good.
'Vhy would a person of Bridwell's standing in this
community jeopardize his entire career for such a
pittance? This does not comport with logic, reason and
justice. Bridwell is not a thief and he is presumed
innocent. Indeed, it can be pointed out here that Wagner in his initial complaint and in the complaint filed
by the Har, merely made a blanket charge that Bridwell
had failed to account for monies received from Dunn
& Bradstreet and then, after Wagner had combed the
files thoroughly, and had charged that Bridwell had
received a much greater amount, came up with only
these three checks. Wagner would have the Hearing
Committee believe that Bridwell diverted a large
sum of money to his own account-an unfounded and
unproved accusation.
The Committee completely lost sight of the
that during the time of these checks Bridwell
'Vagner were enjoying a friendly relationship.
accounting most certainly would have shown
Bridwell was owed, not Wagner.

fact
and
An
that

Bridwell testified that as money would be received,
he would forward it to the company office, which was
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still in operation. Why these three checks were deposited
in his account, he cannot remember at this time. These
transactions happened from ten to eleven years prior
to the hearing in this matter. Is it any wonder he cannot
remember?

(D) ~-tAILING TO ACCOUNT FOR TRIP
EXPENSES.
The Hearing Committee, in its finding as to this
charge, has found that although Bridwell had authority
to incur trip expenses for the first trip to Switzerland,
when both he and Nielson went, that he thereafter
failed to make any accounting to the client itemizing
the expenditure of the $4,000.
As to the money used for the first trip to Europe,
it is admitted by the Hearing Committee that this trip
was authorized. Certainly Wagner and the corporation
both knew that substantial trip expenses were involved.
In addition to this, both Wagner and the Board of
Directors of Precisa specifically ratified the expenses
in the corporate minutes of September 8, 1961. These
minutes specifically reviewed the trip expenses for this
trip. What the Hearing Committee is complaining of
is that at this late date, Bridwell and Nielson did not
come to the hearing with receipts showing how much
was ~pent for every meal and for every last item dealing
with thi5 trip. Both Bridwell and Nielson did testify
that they are sure they did make such an accounting
because the Federal Government in tfie settlement of
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these tax cases accepted these trip expenses. If the
Federal Government accepted their accounting and if
Precisa and Wagner accepted their accounting, why
can't the Hearing Committee accept it?
\¥" e also point out to the Court that Bridwell was
not charged in the complaint filed by the Bar Association
with failing to properly account for trip expenses. The
charge in the complaint was merely a general charge
that he had failed to properly account for monies received from Metropolitan Finance Company. In the
hearing, Bridwell proved that he had properly accounted for this money in view of the fact that the
final $4,000 received from Metropolitan Finance Co.
was used for the first trip to Switzerland. In view of
the fact that Bridwell was not charged in the complaint for failing to make a detailed accounting itemizing all of the expenditures of the trip, the Hearing
Committee cannot now find Bridwell guilty of a charge
not even contained in the complaint. This is the grossest
form of an injustice and under the same principles
involved in the argument pertaining to the adding of
a new charge by amendment, this is likewise a deprivation of procedural due process.

(E) FAILING TO ACCOUNT FOR REFUND FROM THE GOVERNMENT.
The Hearing Committee found that Bridwell failed
to account for the refund of $15,520.00 until October
20, 1962, when Nielson mailed an accounting to
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Wagner showing that the money had been used principally to pay Bridwell and Nielson additional fees
plus payment of real property taxes for Wagner's
benefit.
Bridwell specifically referred to the fact that there
would be a refund and that the I.R.S. people were
interested in knowing whether any of this money refunded would go to Switzerland for Wagner's benefit
or anyone else in the letter of October 12, 1961 (Ex.
16). Bridwell further testified that as soon as Wagner
returned to this country he informed him how the
refund had been distributed, the attorney fee for himself, the fee for Nielson, and the payment of the real
property taxes for Wagner.
In the corporate minutes Wagner and the corporation both acknowledged that further substantial
fees were due and owing to Bridwell, and in the general
power of attorney Bridwell was given authority to
dispose of this refund.
Wagner, of course, has denied that Bridwell informed him of this and claims that the first knowledge
he had of the disposition of the refund was in October
of 1962 when he received the letter from Nielson.
Naturally he would contend this to build up his case.
It appears inconceivable to us that the Hearing Committee could resolve this dispute against Bridwell and
in favor of Wagner.
Throughout the record, it appears that Wagner
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is a man well-schooled in business with a great deal of
bookkeeping experience, and a man who knows where
every penny goes. This man who knew that a refund
would be coming would have us believe that he could
come back to this country and have conferences with
Bridwell about the many matters involved in the winding up of this case and complete the building transaction with Schubach and not once have even mentioned
the subject of the refund and what was done with it.
If he suspected Bridwell of witholding information,
I assume a man of Wagner's business acuity would
have made a direct inquiry to I.R.S.
In addition to this, Wagner had to know that hi.s
real property tax was paid and he certainly knew that
he didn't pay it. So, how can Wagner at this date, come
to this Court and urge the Court to believe him when
he says he knew absolutely nothing as to what was
done with his refund until he received the letter from
Nielson? Obviously, after the open breach with Bridwell, 'Vagner's only purpose in pressing Nielson for
this letter was so that he could come in at a later date
and complain that Bridwell had not accounted to him
for this money.

In any event, the money did not bewng to Wagner
but it belonged to Precisa A.G. (R. 231) (Ex. 35),
and there is not one jot of evidence in this record to
the effect that Precisa at any time was displeased with
Bridwell and was not completely satisfied with the
disposition of this money. Indeed, the letter from
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Bieler in February of 1962 shows that throughout the
entire proceeding Precisa was completely satisfied
and happy with the representation of Bridwell.

It may be sta~ed in pa.ssing that the only mone,IJ
that TV agner ever paid out of his own pocket was the
$2,000.00 which he sent Bridwell for the purpose of the
September 1961 trip to Switzerland. Everything else,
both expenses and fees, was paid by Precisa.
(F) THE CHANDELIER INCIDENT.
The Hearing Committee found as a fact that
Bridwell requested a government auctioneer to withhold a chandelier from the public sale, and that his
purchase of the chandelier on the following day when
no other competitive bidders were expected to be present
was a representation of conflicting interests.
This finding is typical of the unbased blanket
charges made by the complaining witness in this case
and is cont.rary to the evidence in the record.
To begin with, the only evidence concerning the
chandelier incident is Bridwell's testimony. Wagner
was not present at the auction and had no knowledge
except that a chandelier was purchased by Bridwell
at the auction and later given by Bridwell to a friend.
There is no evidence in the record that the auction
was continued at Bridwell's request. Bridwell testified
that Mr. Doxie, the Government representative who
was conducting the auction, asked him if it was all right
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for the auction to be continued. Bridwell did not ask
for the coninuance, Doxie did. The reason why Doxie
asked for the continuance was that there was an indication from a representative of Salt Lake Light and
Fixture Co. that this company could probably pay
substantially more money for the chandelier than had
been indicated. Bridwell's only purpose in agreeing
with Doxie to the continuance was for the benefit of
\Vagner. There is no evidence to the contrary. At any
rate, according to Bridwell's testimony, the auction was
continued and all persons present notified as to the exact
date that the auction would continue. Bridwell testified that at the time the auction was resumed he was
present as well as others, and the possibility of a substantial bid from Salt Lake Light & Fixture Co. did
not materialize. Bridwell further testified that the
highest bid that could be obtained was $145.00 and
that he upped the bid to $150.00, which was the high
bid.
Certainly, Bridwell topping the bi<l could be nothing but a benefit to Wagner. There is no way in the
world to believe that anything Bridwell did in regard
to this incident was done for any other reason than to
benefit \Vagner. How the Hearing Committee could
lrnve made the finding it did in the face of the evi,dence
in this record is beyond comprehension.
This charge is utterly unfounded and ridiculous
in the extreme.

55

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(G) CONFLICTING INTERESTS RE
BUILDING SALE.
The complaint filed by the Bar against llridwell
charged him with "allowing the foreclosure of a con-

tra.ct of sale in the name of t}te client's corporation for
a building located at 375 West Fourth South, Salt
Lake City, Utah, through failure to make proper payrnents with client's funds then available." At the time
of argument, counsel for the Bar admitted that the evidence did not sustain the charge as originally made
and moved that the complaint be amended to conform
to the evidence to the effect that there was a conflict of
interest to the detriment of Wagner and Precisa, evidenced by the manner in which Bridwell handled the
transactions involving the building ( R. 463, 464) .

'Ve objected to this amendment, especially in vie\Y
of the fact that the Bar had two and a half years in
which to make the amendment and five years to obtain
the evidence. Also we objected for the reason that
this was a new charge (R. 464, 465). However, the
Committee allowed the amendment and in its Findings
of Fact held that Bridwell was guilty of a conflict of
interest in representing Schubach, Wagner and Precisa
m the building transaction (R. 463, 464).
It is our contention that the evidence did not show
any conflict of interest on the part of Bridwell to the
detriment of anyone and that further, there could be
no conflict of interest in any event inasmuch as full
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di.sclosure had been made to Precisa and Wagner and
they had ratified the entire matter.
Our argument that the Committee allowing the
amendment has denied Bridwell procedural due process of law will be dealt with later.
Bridwell testified, and his letter to Wagner of
May 19, 1961 (Ex. 5) bears him out, that he informed
Wagner of the fact that the building had gone into
default and that he had obtained an op'tion which was
exercised by his friend Schubach. The wording of
]~rid well' s letter to Wagner indicates that this matter
had been discussed at a prior time when he stated in
part as follows :

"A"lso, as you undoubtedly are aware, Mr.
Hines foreclosed the contract on the Precisa
building approximately 2 years ago. At that
time, anticipating that our tax problems would
be resolved I obtained an option to repurchase
the building on behalf of Precisa at a sum that
would bring the contract current at an increased
interest rate and at a sum that would reimburse
Mr. Hines for expenses of his attorney. * * *
At that time, the company had absolutely no
money, of course, so one of my clients advanced
the money, which was very risky, because as you
will recall there was a great deficiency determined against the corporation. However, that
has been resolved and the corporation is no
longer in jeopardy as pertains to any property
it might own. But my present problem is that
mv client now wants title to the building or else
a ·~·ei;ayment of the funds advanced by him to
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secure the building together with a profit for
the risk he undertook. His actual expenditures
to date are in excess of the sum of $10,000.00.
Pl(f.'lse let me know what Mr. Jost and Precisa A.G., the principal stockholders in Precisa
desire to be done with that building. My client
would like an answer as pertains to that as
rapidly as may be possible."
Bridwell and Schubach both testified that as of
that time and later, Schubach had been willing to merely
receive his money back plus some interest in order to
turn the building back to Precisa. However, Bridwell
testified that Precisa and "\¥" agner as of that time were
unwilling to put more money into the building due to
the fact that the tax cases had not been completely
settled and that there was still some risk that the money
could be lost.
At any rate, when Bridwell went to Switzerland
in the first part of September, 1961, this entire matter
was discussed with Wagner and with the corporation,
and the minutes of the corporation contained a complete recital as to everything that had happened in
regard to the building. Wagner and the principals of
Precisa all signed the minutes approving of everything
that Bridwell had done in regard to the building transaction. The minutes further stated:
"(g) Under possessed authority, counsel exercised the option for the company, then for the
company
conveyed that right to Robert M.
Schubach, which we ratify; it didn't harm us as
we had no funds available.
58
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(h) Mr. Schubach is a dose personal friend
of George E. Bridwell, who is also his personal
attorney. We commend Mr. Schubach on his
confidence and courage in advancing such sums
at that time upon little understanding of issues
and great risk of law suits, attachments and loss.
( i) The building is and would be lost to this
company and we acknowledge and affirm it,
and being fully informed and apprised of all such
matters, it was upon unanimous vote,

RESOLVED:
1. To ratify, consent to and affirm the act
of counsel in exercising said option for the company and thereafter giving it to Robert M. Schubach, the building then lost to the company in
any event, and
2. To ratify, consent to and affirm all actions of counsel in the Hines lawsuit, and all
other matters pertaining to the building and
allied therewith, and

***

To expressly authorize counsel, under his
general power of attorney and the powers herein
given to do such things as may be necessary,
desirable or useful to perfect title in Robert M.
Schubach or his designees, and
4.

5. To request counsel to ask Robert M. Schubach, not oblige him, that he give to the Company or Ernst Jost or to Eugene 'i\T agner, the
first right of refusal to purchase or lease that
building at the same terms as any bona fide offer
he may receive and desires to take and accord
to us 30 days from the date of such offer that
right, we among us to decide which if any of us,
would so act."
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After Wagner returned to this country, he negotiated with Schubach for the purchase of this building.
Bridwell testified that Schubach and Wagner did their
own negotiating exclusively and there is no evidence
rebutting this. Both parties arrived at the figure of
$35,000.00 as a fair sale price and, accordingly, Schubach sold the property to Wagner for the sum of
$35,000.00. Bridwell's sole participation in this matter
was in preparing the promissory note which Wagner
signed for a balance of a little over $2,000.
As stated, the evidence showed that at the time the
building contract went into default there was no
money in the corporate account and the principals of
Precisa and Wagner were unwilling to send more money
to keep the contract alive. Accordingly, Bridwell's ac\
was done solely for the benefit of the company in keep·
ing the building contract alive and enabling a friendly
person to purchase the same.
The sale of the building to Wagner was entirely
within the spirit of the minutes which requested that
Schubach give the Company, Jost or Wagner the first
opportunity to repurchase the building. Wagner was
not harmed in any manner in this transaction inasmuch
as he was able to purchase the building at a fair price
and obtain it in his own name. Prior to that time the
corporation owned the building, Wagner being a minority stockholder with less than one-fifth of the stock
of the corpora tion.
Bridwell and Schubach were not disputed in their
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testimony that up to the time of Bridwell's trip to Switzerland in the first part of September 1961, Schubach
would have been willing to have received his money back
plus some interest for the building. Schubach testified
that his offer involved no profit but merely interest for
the time his money was tied up (R. 137). However, it
can be appreciated that after the threat of Government
intervention was removed by the total settlement of
the tax cases, a different situation existed. At that
time, there was no further jeopardy to Schubach of
having the Government upset his purchase of this building and, therefore, he could deal with it as a full owner.
Certainly the fact that Schubach made a $10,000.00
profit should not be used against Bridwell in this matter.
Bridwell's function was merely to attempt in some way
to save the building so that it could at a later date be
repurchased and this he did. Inaction on Bridwell's
part very likely would have resulted in a complete loss
of the building to the company and Wagner.
The evidence is undisputed that Bridwell received
nothing from this transaction and had no participation
at all in regard to the negotiations between Wagner
and Schubach. Accordingly, there could have been no
conflict of interest on Bridwell's part and there could
be no prejudice to Wagner on account of anything done
by Bridwell. Precisa, the owner, has made no complaint

whatsoever, and, indeed, ratified everything that Bridwell did.
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(H) WITHDRAWAL OF ADDITIONAL
FEES WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION
In paragraph (g) of its }~indings, the Hearing
Committee found that Bridwell's withdrawal of sums
of money over the original $14,000 was without the
authorization or knowledge of the client. The Committee further held that the action of Bridwell in
preparing and securing the adoption of the minutes of
the stockholders' meeting in Switzerland were for his
own protection in order to exonerate himself from any
wrong-doing or excuse any previous conduct for which
he felt he might ultimately have some responsibility
to his client. This finding is without any basis in the
record.
To begin with, in Bridwell's first letter concerning
fee arrangements, he made it clear that he was to have
carte blanche authority to hire any accounting services
which he felt necessary and, further, that he was to make
periodic withdrawals of fees. Bridwell made no secret
of any withdrawals which he made on fees inasmuch as
he drew checks on the company's account, and the cancelled checks were sent to the company's place of business and presumably forwarded to Wagner and the
company in Switzerland. Certainly Bridwell was not
responsible to see that employees of the company forwarded bank accountings to the owners.
At the time of 'the first trip to Switzerland, Bridwell had drawn in excess of the original $14,000 and
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had used the $4,000 from Metropolitan Finance to
pay for the trip. These matters were discussed with
vVagner at the time of that trip. Nielson supported
Bridwell's testimony that Wagner agreed that the fee
would be greater than the original $14,000.00.
During the later trip in September of 1961 when
all of the accountings and records were turned over
to Wagner, Wagner and the company both agreed
to all of the fees that had been paid to Bridwell in the
past and substantial additional fees in the future. Even
in Wagner's self-serving letter of December 2 5, 1961,
some two or three months after returning to the United
States, Wagner referred to the meetings in Switzer•
land in September and to the minutes and general powel
of attorney and stated in part:
"Eventually, after a lengthy discussion of
seven hours, it was understood, that the fee situation as presented that day would be accepted and
you promised not to draw one more dime, except
paying a few thousand dollars to Frank, which
money would come out of the amount due under
the liabilities."
Certainly this letter of Wagner's in which he presented
the matter in a light most favorable to himself, substantiated the fact that both he and the company had
accepted all of the accountings which Bridwell had
presented in September 1961.

It appears to be inconceivable that Wagner could
complain that all of the fees taken over and above
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$14,000 by Bridwell were without authorization when

both he and the company ratified all fees to the time of
September 1961 and agreed that further substantial
fees were due and owing to Bridwell. Wagner's later
statement in his letter of December 25, 1961 is proof
positive that he and the company fully agreed to these
fees as stated in the minutes.
It may be noted that at no t,ime has anyone con-

tended that Bridwell's fee was not reasonable for the
services rendered. It may further be noted that Precisu
paid all but $2,000 of Bridwell's fees and expenses and
there is not one iota of evidence that Precisa was and
is not completely satisfied with everything.
(I) ACCEPTING LABOR AND MATERIALS WITHOUT PROPERLY ACCOUNTING FOR SAME.
Bridwell's contention in regard to this charge is
that this should have been a proper matter for an accounting between the parties. He frankly admits that
he accepted labor and materials for the construction
of a basement bar. Bridwell testified that he had rented
the building to one Joe Looser, who fell behind in the
payment of rent. Looser volunteered to do some work
and Bridwell accepted this work and paid Looser some
money in addition to what Looser owed the company.
Bridwell has at all times been willing to account for
this as well as for the sums which he has advanced out
of his own pocket. However, he has not been given an
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opportunity to do this in view of the fact that Wagner
chose more drastic means to try to settle this account.
Again we say that this charge is typical of the shotgun
approach which was used in this case and is a trivial,
nit-picking charge.
POINT III. THE CORPORATE MINUTES
AND GENERAL POWER OF ATTORNEY
CONSTITUTE A COMPLETE DISCLOSURE
AND RATIFICATION OF BRIDWELL'S
REPRESENTATION
OF WAGNER AND
PRECISA.
In its findings, the Hearing Committee has completely ignored the minutes of the stockholders' meeting
held in Switzerland on September 8, 1961. These minutes were signed by Precisa A.G., Ernst Jost and
Eugene Wagner. The Hearing Committee disposes
peremptorily of these minutes by simply saying that
Bridwell secured them for his own protection. Certainly Bridwell's motives can have no bearing and
the fact remains that this large corporation, its ma~
jority shareholder and Eugene Wagner all willingly
signed these minutes. As a matter of fact, Wagner
not only signed the minutes but typed them up and
hired his own independent Swiss counsel to assist in
persuading the Board of Directors of Precisa A.G.
to accept and to sign them. Apparently the Hearing
Committee believed that Bridwell as a stranger coming
into the country of Switzerland and not even speaking
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the language could completely dominate and overcome
all of these people and force them to do something
against their will.
There was not one jot of evidence to show that
Precisa and Jost did not intend to agree to these minutes or thereafter desired to repudiate them. As a
matter of fact, the Bieler letter in February of 1962,
indicates a friendly relationship and a complete satisfaction on the part of Precisa to the representation of
Bridwell.
The only person who has attempted to repudiate
these minutes is Wagner and even Wagner in December 1961 indicates his complete agreement with the
minutes except for the matter of additional fees.
The minutes state as follows:
"I. To ratify, consent to, affirm and approve
all settlements and offers of settlement to this
date, and
2. To ratify, consent, acknowledge and affirm
that all travel expenses, accounting fees and
legal fees, as reflected by the above mentioned
accountings, pre_l'ared by Fnrnk Nielson,C.P.A.,
of Nielson, Psarras and Nilson, C.P.A.'s, Salt
Lake City, Utah, be, and they hereby are accepted and ack.-101\+~J<:red a'> being a valid an(l
reasonable and just obligation of the Corporation, no part of which is, has been, or will inure
for payment of fees for Eugene Wagner in his
personal tax cases, he being indebted to George
E. Bridwell for fees for personal representation
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in a substantial sum, $2,000 of which has been
paid to this date, and
3. That the expenses of George E. Bridwell's
1961 trip to Switzerland be assumed, paid and

discharged by Mr. Wagner, since the company
paid such expenses for both Mr. Nielsen and
Mr. Bridwell in 1958, and
4. It being fully understood that as a result
and consequence of the protracted and continuing and exacting technical and mechanical and
academic nature of professional services rendered
to date and to be rendered in the future to time
of full conclusion, coupled with the realized and
acknowledged superior results achieved to date
it is understood there are further substantial fees,
validly and avowedly due as a corporate obligation for legal and accounting services rendered
and to be rendered, to George E. Bridwell and
Frank Nielsen, and George E. Bridwell shall
be and he is hereby authorized to make and
authorize such corporate obligations and payment therefor as he may deem fit, in accord herewith and in accord with the General Power of
Attorney to be given him as hereinafter set forth
in this Resolution, and

5. It being understood and realized that full
and total designation of all corporate powers be
delegated as to all matters now known and that
may become known for such independent and
immediate action as may be necessary, useful or
desirable for the furtherance, winding up or continuance of the affairs of the company, a broad
and General Power of Attorney shall be executed by us, for and on behalf of the Company
and by the Company to George E. Bridwell,
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which power, we direct, after proper executing
be delivered to George E. Bridwell."
The minutes then continued to outline in detail the
history of the building transaction and the fact that the
option had been exercised by Schubach, and ratified
all of the acts stated, and requested that the Company,
Jost or Wagner be given the first right of refusal to
repurchase the building at the market price.
These corporate minutes and the general power
of attorney which were signed by Wagner, Jost and
the corporation contain a complete disclosure of everything done in this case and a ratification on the part
of these parties of everything done by Bridwell. The
corporation has not complained and it is inconceivable
to m that Wagner should now come 'to the Bar Association of the State of Utah and be heard to complain
about Bridwell's representation. It is no answer to say
that Bridwell wanted these corporate minutes signed
for his own protection. Wagner and the Precisa people
did not have to sign the minutes. They had independent
legal advice and signed these minutes in calm deliberation.

If Bridwell's representation had been as stated by
Wagner, then certainly they would have fired Bridwell
and obtained new counsel. However, they chose to
continue with Bridwell and were pleased with his work.
Wagner, as a minority stockholder and as a freeloader
who only paid $2,000 of the total, should not now be
allowed to complain to the Bar and this Court about
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Bridwell after he received most of the benefits and
assumed little of the burdens.
POINT IV. NO CONFLICT OF INTEREST
WAS SHOWN.
Conflict of interest is defined as when on behalf
of one client it is the lawyer's duty to contend for that
which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
See Canons of Professional Ethics, Section 6, and Zimrner v. Gudmundsen, 5 N.W.2d 707, 715, 142 Neb. 260.
The evidence in this case fails to show any conflict of
interest on the part of Bridwell. The findings found a
conflict of interest both in regard to the chandelier
incident and the building transaction. In neither case
was there any evidence that Bridwell was representing
conflicting interests within the above definition. The
evidence showed that the continuance of the auction was
reqnes~ed not by Bridu·dl ln t h!J the auctioneer and
Bridwell merely consented in the interest of attempting
to obtain more money for Wagner for the chandelier.
The fact that Bridwell later outbid the highest bidder
shows a further effort to benefit Wagner. There was
and could be no conflict of interest in that situation.
1

As far as the building incident was concerned, the
only possible purpose that Bridwell could have in
obtaining the option and persuading Schubach to
invest his own money, was to keep the building from
getting into unfriendly, strange hands. Of course the
Government had to be satisfied and it was the true fact
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that Schubach's purchase of the building was a bona
fide transaction. At a later date, after the Government
was out of the case, Schubach merely acted like any
other seller of land, bargaining with Wagner for a fair
sale price. There was no evidence that Bridwell had
anything to do with these negotiations. The only thing
that Bridwell did was to prepare a promissory note in
accordance with the agreement which had been reached
by ""\\T agner and Schubach. There could be no conflict
of interest in this transaCtion.
POINT V. THERE CAN BE NO CONFLICT OF INTEREST WHERE COMPLETE
DISCLOSURE IS MADE.
It is settled that disclosure and consent is a complete defense to any charge of improper conduct on
account of representing conflicting interests. It is stated
at 17 A.L.R.3d, 839, "It has been held that an attorney
at law has a duty not to represent clients with conflicting interests without making a full disclosure to

them of the facts concerning such conflict and obtaining
their consent to such representµtion." See Canons of
Professional Ethics, Section 6.
We submit that a complete disclosure was made
and consent obtained in this case as shown by the undisputed evidence. Prior to the time of the September
1961 trip to Switzerland, Bridwell had informed
Wagner of what had been done in regard to the building. At the time of the meetings in September 1961,
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further discussion was held, and, ultimately, the minutes
were prepared by Bridwell and Wagner and were
signed by the corporation, Jost and Wagner. These
minutes show full disclosure, consent and ratification
as to what was done with the building and what was to
be done in the future. There can be no conflict of
interest in such a case.
At a subsequent time, in accordance with the request in the minutes, Schubach gave Wagner an opportunity to purchase the property at a fair market price
and he and Wagner both agreed on the price. No one
twisted Wagner's arm. He did not have to buy the
building. The evidence is undisputed that Bridwell had
no participation in these negotiations.
Accordingly, for this reason alone, the conflict of
interest charge must be dismissed.
POINT VI. BRIDWELL WAS DEPRIVED
OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS WHEN
THE BAR 'VAS ALLOWED TO ADD A NE'V
CHARGE IlY AMENDMENT IN THE HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE.
The ruling in the recent c:i.s·.~ of In the M attcr
of Ruffalo, supra, requires tb:tt the added charge of
representing conflicting interests in regard to the
building transaction, be di~;rnis~ed for the reason that
Bridwell was depriYe<l of proc~dural due process.
The Ruffalo c~se dealt with a disbarment proceeding in the State of Ohio, where the petitioner was
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charged with various acts of misconduct. Among
other things, he was charged with soliciting business in
F.E.L.A. cases through an agent. In the hearing of
this matter, both petitioner and the agent testified to
the effect that Ruffalo had hired the agent merely to
investigate F.E.L.A. cases. Their testimony showed
that the agent was a railroader employed by a railroad
which was sometimes involved in cases investigated by
the agent. Immediately after the hearing, the Board
added a charge by amendment against petitioner based
on his hiring an agent to investigate his own employer.
This disbarment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of
Ohio and Petition for Certiorari was denied. In a
Federal Court Order to Show Cause proceeding, the
petitioner complained that he had been denied procedural due process by not being notified of the new charge
and tried on said charge without an adequate opportunity to defend. The Supreme Court of the United
States held that the petitioner was deprived of procedural due process which includes fair notice of the
charge, and, accordingly, reversed the decision of the
Federal District Court. The Court stated at p. 1226:
"Disbarment, designed to protect the public,
is a punishment or penalty imposed on the lawyer. citing cases * * * He is accordingly entitled
to procednral due process, which includes fair
notice of the charge. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257, 273, 68 S.Ct. 499, 507, 92 L.Ed. 682. It
was said in Randall v. Brigham, 7 'iV all. 523,
540, 19 L.Ed. 285, that when proceedings for
disbarment are 'not take 1 1 for matters occurring
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in open court, in the presence of the judges
notice should be given to the attorney of th~
charges made and opportunity afforded him for
explanation and defense.' Therefore, one of the
conditions this Court considers in determining
whether disbarment by a State should be followed by disbarment here is whether 'the state
procedure from want of notice or opportunity to
be heard was wanting in due process.'

* * * The charge must be known before the
proceedings commence. They become a trap
when, after they are under way, the charges are
amended on the basis of testimony of the accused.
He can then be given no opportunity to expunge
the earlier statements and start afresh. * * *
This absence of fair notice as to the reach of
the grievance procedure and the precise nature
of the charges deprived the petitioner of procedural due process.''
It is submitted that the case at Bar falls squarely
within the holding of the Ruffalo case. In the case at
Bar, Bridwell was charged with failing to use money
then available to maintain the contract. After the Bar
had failed to prove the charge in the complaint and
Bridwell had testified, the prosecutor moved to amend
by adding the new charge that Bridwell represented conflicting interest in regard to the building transaction.
The amendment was allowed and the Hearing Committee found against Bridwell on it. This is squarely
against the holding of the Ruffalo case which holds
that in order for Bridwell to be afforded the guarantee
of procedural due process he must be given fair notice
of the charge.
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The original complaint by the complaining witness
in this matter was made on October 1, 1962, and the
hearing was not held until nearly six years later. Certainly during that period of time the Bar had ample
opportunity to investigate the matter and to make a
correct charge. To allow the Bar to amend after accused
has fully testified on the matter and then find accused
guilty is the worst sort of an injustice and squarely
violates the right of procedural due process as provided
by the Fourteenth Amendment. For this reason alone,
this charge must be dismissed.

CONCLUSION
The Commission has failed to recognize and discharge one of its most fundamental responsibilities, that
of protecting a respected member of the Utah Bar from
an unwarranted attack by a malcontented ex-client. It
has ignored the fact that the accused is clothed with
the presumption of innocence, is an officer of the court,
and has a good reputation for truthfulness and veracity
in this community. It has ignored the fact that the
accuser, on the other hand, is a man of shoddy character
and reputation.
A number of questions remain unanswered.
I. Why did the Hearing Committee and the Com-

mission ignore the corporate minutes and the general
power of attorney which constitute a complete vindication of Bridwell?
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2. Why did the Hearing Committee and the Com-

mission ignore the unprecedented lapse of time between
charge and hearing?
3. Why did the Hearing Committee and the Com-

mission allow the amendment?
4. Why did the Hearing Committee and the Com-

mission take the word of Wagner over Bridwell?
5. Why did the Hearing Committee and the Com-

mission find a violation of ethics with regard to such
trivial matters as the chandelier incident and the used
brick incident?
6. How could Bridwell by letter and telegram

completely overwhelm a shrewd businessman and a
giant corporation 5,000 miles away and by duress and
undue influence force them to give him an undeserved
fee?
7. vVhy did 'V agner secrete the three checks and

flash them on Bridwell for the first time nearly seven
years later?
8. If the Government, Precisa, and Wagner were

satisfied with the accountings rendered by Bridwell and
Nielson why not the Commission? Should they in all
fairness actually expect receipts for meals and hotel
bills after ten years?
9. How can Wagner complain about the building

transaction when he derived a substantial benefit from
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it and entered into it voluntarily and with his eyes
wide open?
It is clear that George Bridwell was denied his

right to a speedy trial and that he is innocent. For
these reasons we urge his vindication.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN L. BLACK
RAWLINGS, ROBERTS &
:BLACK
530 Judge Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for George E. Bridwell
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